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RIGHTS OF PERSONALITY IN SCOTS LAW:   
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
(Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Dundee 
University Press, 2009) 
Reviewed by Olivier Moréteau* 
 
This book features a collection of papers presented at a 
Conference organized on May 5 and 6, 2006, at the University of 
Strathclyde in Glasgow. The Conference aimed at giving an 
overview of issues and options available in Scots law regarding the 
protection of personality rights. The perspective was comparative, 
covering various civil law and common jurisdictions and other 
mixed jurisdictions. The concept of personality right is of civil law 
fabric. Rooted in Roman law, the term „rights of the personality‟ 
was coined by 20th century civilian doctrine to describe the 
protection of non-patrimonial aspects of the human person, such as 
life, bodily integrity, personal security, physical liberty, reputation, 
dignity, privacy, image, moral right to copyright, family 
relationships, rights of deceased‟s relatives. The essays gathered in 
the book tend to prove however that the Scottish approach is more 
remedy-based than right-based, the focus being on the tort action 
and its conditions. Personality rights are all too often entangled 
with patrimonial rights, and the identification of a personality 
rights will at most help identify a primary right that deserves 
protection even where the loss is entirely non-pecuniary. 
There is much focus on the taxonomy of personality rights, 
checking what is included here and excluded there. It is common 
knowledge, at least in civil law jurisdictions, that personality rights 
are inalienable, imprescriptible, and cannot be abandoned. The 
book offers little discussion however of what personality rights are 
in essence. Such rights can indeed be monetized, and the 
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borderline between the extra-patrimonial and the patrimonial rights 
is not always an easy one to draw, as some cases discussed in the 
book may show. The right an actress has on her image under 
French law may serve as an example. A case decided in Paris in 
1975 featured French superstar Catherine Deneuve.
1
 She had 
consented to the publication of photos taken at a time when she 
was acting as a professional model, occasionally posing in the 
nude. The magazine who had published such photos sold them to 
another magazine that republished those years later, at a time when 
Catherine Deneuve had become an iconic and highly respected 
actress. Though the magazine owned the pictures, Catherine 
Deneuve was allowed to object to the publication and argue that 
her personality right to her image had been invaded. The court held 
that the magazine was supposed to request her consent prior to 
publication. Any attorney or scholar familiar with French cases 
knows that the more a person protects her privacy or image rights, 
the more likely she is of being awarded higher damages in case of 
infringement of such rights. On the contrary, famous people who 
usually tolerate the publication of gossip and photos taken within 
the realm of their private life, though not losing the right to 
protection—after all it is inalienable and may not be abandoned—
are more likely than not to get minimal or nominal damages. Given 
the fact that tabloids will anyway publish gossip to maximize their 
sales, celebrities, by choosing not to tolerate any infringement, can 
monetize their private life and image by selling ex ante the right to 
publish under pre-determined conditions, or collecting ex post in 
the form of damages that French courts try to keep sufficiently 
high to serve as deterrent. That point is strongly criticized by both 
editors of the book: Niall Whitty in his essay in the book
2
 and 
Reinhard Zimmermann in his major book on the law of 
obligations.
3
 The reading of the book shows that Scotland looks at 
personality rights with tort law lenses rather than with over-
permissive subjective rights lenses, thereby limiting the risk of 
commodification of extra-patrimonial rights, all too real in French 
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jurisprudence, where the right to respect of one‟s image was once 
based on property rights.
4
   
One may compare this with the moral right of the author or 
artist under copyright law. In most civil law jurisdictions and under 
the Bern Convention, the artist or author of copyrighted work may 
sell the copyright, which is intellectual property and therefore 
patrimonial, yet keeping at all times a moral right allowing her to 
object to a use of the work that in the opinion of the author would 
distort the artistic value of the work. This moral right being 
attached to the personality of the creator is inalienable and cannot 
be abandoned, and is therefore a personality right. The study by 
David Vaver (Chapter 8)
5
 shows that the moral right is much 
weaker at English law where it may be waived. In jurisdictions 
where it is stronger, it may be monetized much like the right to 
one‟s image in the example above.  
Born and developed in the matrix of private law, the concept of 
personality right has grown a constitutional dimension, which is 
not surprising given the fact that it enshrines personal freedom and 
human dignity. This constitutional dimension is a central feature of 
several of the papers gathered in the book. The European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) indeed strengthens the 
fundamental rights dimension with Article 8(1) that provides: 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence,” the same Convention protecting 
liberty of expression and freedom of the press in its Article 10. It 
was not until the year 2000 that the ECHR was to acquire the force 
of law in the United Kingdom and therefore in Scotland, by the 
effect of the Human Rights Act 1998. The impact of the ECHR in 
Scotland is carefully researched by Elspeth Reid (Chapter 4),
6
 who 
investigates to what extent Convention rights, in so far as they 
address rights of personality, already find protection in Scots law. 
She uses comparative law to identify possible gaps and 
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developments that may be needed. She clearly indicates that one 
has to look beyond England, and points out to South Africa, 
another mixed jurisdiction, and countries of continental Europe.  
South Africa is ubiquitous in the volume, which is not 
surprising, since much like Scotland, it is a mixed jurisdiction 
without a civil code. Jonathan Burchell offers a detailed 
presentation in Chapter 6, with a focus on human dignity.
7
 He 
shows the use of the actio iniuriarum, “the general Roman remedy 
for impairments of personality rights to physical integrity, 
reputation, and dignity”8 as a basis of the protection of personality 
rights in South Africa before and after the Constitution of 1996. 
Post-apartheid developments include the right to housing, the right 
to social security and appropriate social assistance for those unable 
to support themselves,
9
 the right to family life, due process rights, 
showing flexible adjustments. The Roman law concept of iniuria 
indeed easily adjusts to the new constitutional and legislative 
requirements to favor the enforcement of human rights. Professor 
Burchell‟s contribution is a plea in favor of the delictual actio 
iniuriarum: “The objective criterion will allow a court to balance 
the interests involved, engage in a proportionality inquiry weighing 
issues such as need, available resources, degree of harm, urgency 
of relief, including availability of alternative remedies, and 
recognize those defences that reflect reasonable behavior.”10 He 
shows “the pivotal nature of dignity” as a right and not just a value. 
He reminds the Scots that T.B. Smith was in favor of a rejuvenated 
actio iniuriarum focused on the concept of “affront” 
(contumelia).
11
 Much in this contribution is of great interest for 
Scotland as well as other mixed jurisdictions such as Louisiana.  
The laws of Continental Europe are explored in Chapter 5, 
written by Gert Brüggemeier, covering France, Germany, and 
Italy.
12
 Professor Brüggemeier rightly points to the hybrid nature 
of personality rights, which constitute in his opinion a sort of 
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“private human rights.”13 Born in the realm of private law from the 
Roman law of injuries (actio iniuriarum), it was given 
constitutional protection after World War II, in national 
constitutions and also in the ECHR. He concludes his survey of the 
law in the three countries by a section on the ECHR and an 
analysis of the Caroline von Hannover v. Germany case, decided 
by the European Court of Human Rights in 2004. The case shows 
how difficult it is to balance the protection of private life (Art. 8 
ECHR) with freedom of expression and of the press, also protected 
by the Convention (Art. 10 ECHR), an issue that has been 
carefully studied in the context of European tort law.
14
 It also 
indicates a possible diversity of approach regarding the protection 
of the private life of celebrities. French courts insist that everyone, 
including celebrities, is entitled to the protection of one‟s private 
life on the basis of the overreaching provision of Civil Code, Art. 
9. This places the burden on journalists to prove that they have 
obtained prior consent before publishing stories or pictures 
featuring celebrities in their private life, even when the story takes 
place outside private walls, in the eye of the public. Neglecting 
these details, the author rightly insists on the somehow 
constitutional nature of Art. 9.
15
 
 Germany has a different approach in the sense that courts, 
following a law enacted in 1907, accept that pictures of public 
figures can be taken and published without their express consent 
except where taken within their residential areas.
16
 In Caroline von 
Hannover v. Germany, the European Court held that even pictures 
taken outside the private residence had to be authorized, Art. 8 
extending the protection to everyone, including celebrities. It is 
only when public figures perform in an “official function,” that the 
right to privacy is not to be applied, a position long adopted by 
French law, which is in compliance with Art. 8 ECHR. Regarding 
the right to informational privacy, Scots law had a restrictive 
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approach in the sense that protection was only afforded when the 
information was wrong or malicious (malicious falsehood). The 
scope is considerably enlarged with the implementation of ECHR, 
Art. 8.  
Whether they are familiar with Scots law or not, readers will 
learn a lot reading the first chapters of the book. Issues and options 
are clearly exposed by the editors in Chapter 1, which gives an 
overview of the subject insisting on the historical and political 
background that makes Scotland such a unique place before and 
after devolution.
17
 The editors then focus on what they view as the 
key issues, and not surprisingly these include the integration of the 
ECHR right to privacy. Other questions pop up such as how to 
protect rights of personality, whether a right to publicity should be 
introduced, and whether personality rights should be codified, a 
question that in their opinion deserves a negative answer.  
Following chapters address these questions. In what appears to 
be the longest contribution in the book (Chapter 2 counts over 110 
pages), John Blackie gives a rich and detailed overview of the 
history of personality rights in Scots law, from the 16th century to 
the mid-19th century,
18
 looking backwards (doctrinal history), 
sideways (comparative law), and forward (law reform proposals) 
to make informed decision as to where to go.
19
 Readers having a 
lesser interest in legal history will value the Editors‟ summary of 
John Blackie‟s findings.20 His well-documented exploration shows 
how much Scots law was based on the ius commune until it 
received English influence during the 19th century. Real injury 
(iniuria realis) and verbal injury (iniuria verbalis) evolved and 
developed as sub-categories of iniuria, generating a complex and 
confusing taxonomy. The full page figures at p. 38 (the delict of 
iniuria in Scotland in 1700) and 103 (the delict of injury in 1850) 
give a fascinating overview of shifting categories and the text 
reveals the fertility and flexibility of the delict of injury to cover 
new situations, such as invasions of privacy once people‟s sphere 
of privacy started to expand.  
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Niall Whitty, co-editor of the book, gives a full overview of 
rights of privacy in Scots law (Chapter 3).
21
 His hundred-page long 
chapter insists on categories that vary from one system to another. 
After defining the fundamental concepts, and particularly those of 
real and verbal injury derived from Roman law, but also those of 
dignity, autonomy, and privacy, he ventures into categorizing, 
using Johan Neethling‟s typology as a starting point.22 Such 
personality rights are primary rights and their infringement is a 
delict, imposing a secondary obligation on the wrongdoer to repair 
or remedy. The primary right might be imprescriptible, the 
secondary one is not and may be extinguished by prescription. He 
then describes the thirteen personality rights identified by 
Neethling: right to life, the rights to bodily integrity and to 
personal security, the right to physical liberty, the right to honor 
and reputation, the right to dignity in the narrow sense (self-
esteem; honor; and freedom from insult), the right to privacy 
(seclusion from intrusion), the right to informational privacy (non-
disclosure of private information), the right to identity or image, 
the right to publicity (appropriation of image and reification of 
right to privacy and image), the moral right to copyright, the right 
to autonomy (still debated in Scotland), personality rights in family 
relationships, personality rights after death. Professor Whitty‟s 
treatment of the elements of liability for infringing rights of 
personality shows the paramount importance of tort law concepts 
in this area and as everywhere in his essay the approach is 
comparative, showing familiarity with European projects such as 
the Principles of European Tort Law. Transmissibility of the action 
and remedies are also discussed in this very rich essay.  
There is much more in the book, including the already 
mentioned Continental European and South African perspectives 
to which one must add a very informative discussion of English 
law perspectives, by Hazel Carty, showing how English law 
remains “mistrustful of generalised rights” (Chapter 7).23 The final 
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 autonomy in medical law,
25
 and a 
presentation of the very impressive personality database covering a 
number of significant legal systems, that has fed a comparative 
survey, discussed by Charlotte Waelde and Niall Whitty.
26
 Hector 
McQueen‟s Hitchhiker‟s guide to personality rights in Scots law 
concludes the volume, road mapping the complex personality 
rights galaxy in Scots law.
27
 May be for the reason that it primarily 
addresses privacy, it has not been placed at the beginning of the 
volume, where the reader would be happy to find a road map. It 
inevitably repeats some information available elsewhere in the 
book but offers a most valuable guide, starting with the impact of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 and ending with a survey of other 
relevant statutes, also promenading through English cases on 
breach of confidence and the actio iniuriarum of Scots law.  
Altogether, this is a remarkable and most informative 
comparative law book that every scholar interested in personality 
rights in Scotland, Europe, or in any other jurisdiction must read or 
consult. More generally, the book shows the great vitality of the 
civil law tradition of Scotland and the many ways it interacts both 
with English law and European law and keeps developing as a very 
dynamic mixed jurisdiction, connected to so many others. In the 
reviewer‟s opinion, there is no better place than mixed jurisdictions 
to test legal theories and doctrines, see how they interact and 
identify what is working best. Scotland has developed a pragmatic 
view of what personality rights are, half way between the 
generalization of the French and the casuistic approach of the 
English, proving in this field as in others that Scots law is a 
modern continuation of Roman law. A French scholar trained in 
France and having migrated to another mixed jurisdiction, the 
reviewer cannot help thinking that the late Hélène David
28
 and 
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 would have liked and valued this book, much as they 
would also have enjoyed Mixed Jurisdictions Compared, Private 
Law in Louisiana and Scotland, edited by Vernon Palmer and 
Elspeth Reid,
30
 published that very same year, also containing an 
essay on personality rights.
31
 
Together with the Dundee University Press, the editors have 
done a great job making the book easy to read and navigate, with a 
sequential numbering of chapters and sections, detailed tables of 
content at the beginning of every chapter, and useful indexes and 
tables. This review will end where the book starts: the short 
foreword by Lord Hope is a must read. It offers insightful thoughts 
on the impact of academic work on the judiciary and the vital 
importance of comparative law on the development of Scots law, 
of which the book is a brilliant demonstration. 
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